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This paper proposes a simple model to evaluate the role of regulatory controls. It is 
formulated so as to enable drawing empirical conclusions on the basis of usual 
hypothesis tests. Three potential roles of standards are examined: they can act as 
penalties for non-compliant firms, as norms to which all firms converge, and as 
controls with cumulative impact over time. I test this specification focusing on 
automobile fuel economy (CAFE) standards that have been imposed in the US since 
1978, using annual data from each major auto manufacturer. Results show that CAFE 
rules, functioning mainly as penalties, have been an important determinant of car fuel 
consumption. The hypothesis that standards acted also as norms is rejected. Finally, 
the automobile industry as a whole became less constrained by regulations over the 
years because of stagnating CAFE standards since 1990 and progress in vehicle 
technology.  
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 1. Introduction 
The effect of regulatory standards has been studied extensively in the public 
economics literature, largely with focus on environmental regulations. There have 
been significant theoretical contributions (and some empirical demonstrations as well) 
on several related issues such as: the comparison between performance and design 
standards [2] or between price-based and quantity-based regulations [32]; the 
effectiveness of market mechanisms, e.g. emission permits, versus command-and-
control standards [16]; or aspects of regulatory enforcement such as whether 
compliance can be maximized through targeting firms [17, 20] or self-reporting [29], 
how to define penalties for noncompliant firms [24] or whether to warn them before 
imposing fines [34]. Extending the investigation to health insurance markets, 
Finkelstein [9] examined the empirical evidence of the effect of binding minimum 
standards on the market for voluntary private health insurance for the elderly in the 
US. 
In energy and environmental issues, the importance of fuel economy (FE) regulations 
for motor vehicles is a much debated topic because, among the various adverse side 
effects of transportation such as congestion, traffic accidents and local air pollution, 
energy and climate change related impacts are prominent. The share of transportation 
in total energy use and greenhouse gas emissions is increasing worldwide because 
demand for private mobility is still growing and automobile energy efficiency remains 
virtually stagnant. Advanced energy saving and low carbon-emitting technologies like 
fully electric vehicles or fuel cells are not expected to experience significant 
penetration rates very soon. It is therefore important to achieve considerable energy 
efficiency improvements for vehicles entering the market in the near future which will 
largely be powered by conventional engines and fuels. 
One way to raise the fuel economy
1 of new cars is through standards, either 
mandatory or as a voluntary commitment of the automotive industry. A second way is 
to increase fuel taxation in order to induce purchases of more efficient cars and 
discourage private car travel. Mandatory FE standards (Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy – CAFE – standards) have been in force in the US since 1978. Other 
countries followed later, and currently Canada, Australia, Japan, the 15 old EU 
Member States, Switzerland, China, Taiwan and South Korea have implemented 
some type of standards. Although the adoption of standards has induced FE 
improvements, there are voices arguing against standards and favoring increases in 
fuel taxes instead because welfare impacts are estimated to be lower under the latter 
option. 
In this policy context, FE regulations have been the subject of both theoretical and 
empirical exploration, mainly in the US. Several approaches have been used in the 
attempt to analyze the effects of standards on automobile fuel economy, from cross-
section time series analyses [8, 22] to partial and general equilibrium models [1, 12, 
26, 27, 35, 41]. A key feature in most of these analyses is the simulation of the 
                                                 
1 The equivalent terms fuel economy (expressed in miles per gallon) and fuel consumption (expressed 
in liters per 100 kilometers) are linked by the following relationship: fuel consumption (l/100 km) = 
235.2 / fuel economy (mpg).  
  2decision-making process of automobile manufacturers: producers maximize profits or 
minimize costs depending, inter alia, on whether FE regulations represent a binding 
constraint for them or not. Extending the discussion to air pollutant emissions, 
Khazzoom [25] and Harrington [18] have explored potential linkages between fuel 
economy and vehicle emission regulations. 
In a different field, studying the effects of government controls on UK firm dividends, 
Mayer and Pashardes [31] explored three ways that regulations may affect company 
behavior: they can act as penalty thresholds, as norms towards all firms converge, or 
as controls with cumulative impact over time. In this paper I adopt this framework for 
the study of motor vehicle fuel economy standards. I develop a simple theoretical 
model for new car fuel consumption that is general enough to accommodate all three 
aspects of standards mentioned above, in a way that enables testing these assumptions 
on empirical grounds with simple hypothesis tests. I then apply the model using firm 
level data of automobile sales in the US from 1975 to 2006.  
In the context of automobile fuel economy, most studies employed cross-section time 
series analyses and did not include standards explicitly as an explanatory variable (see 
e.g. [8, 22, 40]), with the exception of Gately [10] and Small and van Dender [38] 
who used a regulatory variable in a time series context. [13] may be the only study 
applying a model that is similar to the first stages of this approach. The method 
proposed here, however, significantly extends that of Greene [13] as his objective was 
primarily to test the role of standards as constraints on some firms, which is only the 
first of the three potential roles of standards that I will explore here.  
A feature of many models that have been designed to assess the effectiveness of 
CAFE rules is that they simulate decisions of firms, such as shifting their sales mix 
from (more profitable) bigger to smaller cars [26, 27], from cars to (less constrained 
by CAFE) light trucks [1, 35, 41], or from domestic to imported vehicles [12]. As 
such firm behavior cannot be captured explicitly by the model presented in this paper, 
the primary intention of the model is to explore the same issue from a different 
viewpoint. As I will explain in Section 2, examining regulations in this way has 
important implications for the evaluation of energy and environmental policies. 
Moreover, I will try to show at the end of this paper that the proposed model can be 
employed in other regulatory frameworks and thus can contribute to the empirical 
assessment of standards or other types of controls. 
The next section provides a description of the three types of regulatory effects that I 
will explore. Section 3 presents the model specification. Section 4 describes how the 
theoretical model was adapted for the needs of the empirical analysis. Section 5 
outlines the application of the model utilizing company level data from US 
automobile manufacturers and mentions potential policy implications of the results. 
Section 6 concludes and outlines possible extensions of the method so that it can be 
applied in other regulatory settings as well. 
 
  32. The different roles of regulations 
As already mentioned, [30] explored three ways that regulations may affect company 
behavior: they can act as penalties, as norms, or as controls with cumulative impact. 
The following paragraphs will clarify each one of these concepts. 
The penalty role is straightforward. For example, CAFE rules in the US foresee that 
each manufacturer whose fleet-average fuel economy figure is lower than the standard 
will pay as a fine 5.5 US$ per car sold per 0.1 mpg of shortfall. In the European 
Union (EU), manufacturers have voluntarily committed themselves to reducing the 
average amount of carbon dioxide (CO2) emitted by new cars at 140 grams per 
kilometer by the year 2008, compared to the 1995 average of 185 g/km
2. In this case 
there is no explicit penalty, but non-attainment of the target may force policy makers 
to make more stringent decisions in the future, and may also lead to some loss of 
reputation among the environmentally conscious public, so that it can be viewed as an 
implicit fine to be paid by the industry.  
Secondly, standards may act as norms in the sense that firms which consistently 
perform better than required may find it more profitable to worsen their performance 
to some extent, provided that they still outperform the standard. Suppose that a 
specific manufacturer produces smaller-than-average cars and therefore its sales-
weighted fuel economy is higher than the standard. Regulatory compliance offers this 
company a comparative advantage over those firms which are constrained by 
regulations and are forced to downsize and/or improve technically their products, or 
otherwise pay the fines due to non-compliance. Thus such a manufacturer may 
gradually shift its production towards bigger cars, whose production is generally more 
profitable than that of small cars
3. This can be effected if compliant firms abstain 
from investing on fuel-saving technologies and put more emphasis on offering more 
powerful and comfortable automobiles. The estimates of Greene [13] provide some 
evidence from such firm behavior in the US as a result of CAFE regulations: a tighter 
standard seems to lead not only to a change in the mix of vehicles produced by a 
constrained firm so as to meet the standard, but also to increased consumer demand 
for less fuel efficient vehicles of unconstrained firms. Japanese auto producers were 
typical examples of unconstrained firms in the US market, particularly in the late 
1970s and early 1980s when US manufacturers were considerably affected by CAFE 
regulations. Thorpe [41] explains in detail the theoretical background of this aspect, 
and his general equilibrium simulations provide similar evidence. However, the 
simulations depend critically on the magnitude of the substitution elasticities he uses, 
and in fact his sensitivity analysis shows indeterminate evidence about the real size of 
this effect in the US market. 
Finally, the cumulative aspect of standards has been reported by Poterba [37] in the 
case of UK government controls on firm dividends during the 1970s. According to 
this, the effect of standards cumulates over time, and the value of the control variable 
                                                 
2 CO2 emissions are proportional to fuel consumption, so that CO2 emission standards are roughly 
equivalent to fuel economy standards. 
3 Sperling et al. [39] provide a review of evidence that larger cars are more profitable to the industry 
than smaller ones. 
  4relates not only to the actually observed value of past years but also to its ‘notional’ 
value, i.e. the value that the variable would have taken in the absence of any 
standards. In our case, this hypothesis implies that fuel economy depends, apart from 
the standard, on the unconstrained fuel economy level that would satisfy consumer 
requirements; this in turn depends on market characteristics such as fuel prices, 
technological progress, and consumer preferences for vehicle size, top speed or 
maximum vehicle power. 
A consequence of this hypothesis is that a ‘catch-up’ effect can occur if regulations 
are lifted. This may be particularly relevant in the automobile market: consumer 
preferences for ever bigger and more powerful cars might continuously shift upwards 
the ‘notional’ value of vehicle fuel consumption, thus putting continuously more 
burden on firms to meet the standards. Conversely, technical progress or other effects 
may decrease this notional value so that compliance may become easier over the 
years, even despite stricter regulations. Depending on the difference between notional 
and actual fuel consumption, an eventual abolition of standards might (or might not) 
lead to a sharp deterioration of fuel economy. 
Examining these roles of standards has crucial implications for the assessment of 
regulatory energy and environmental policies and can provide ex post answers to 
questions such as: Were firms really constrained by specific regulations (i.e. did 
regulations indeed act as penalties)? Did standards have undesirable side effects (i.e. 
did they act as norms for compliant firms)? If regulations are relaxed or abandoned, 
how might firms respond (i.e. do standards have a cumulative impact)? Such 
questions can only be answered if these individual regulatory effects are modeled 
explicitly. 
 
3. Theoretical specification 
Suppose that a vehicle manufacturer produces cars with average fuel consumption 
(measured in liters per 100 kilometers) equal to F, while the optimal fuel consumption 
level of its vehicle fleet (i.e. the level that would maximize its profits) is F
*, with F
* 
depending on consumer preferences, retail fuel prices and other factors. Any deviation 
of actual fuel consumption from its market optimum incurs costs CM to the firm. 
Assuming these costs to be quadratic in order to have a quite general specification that 
allows F to be greater or less than F
*, it follows that 
CM = α1 (F
* – F)
2         ( 1 )  
with α1 ≥ 0.  
Νon-compliance with the FE standard F
R will also lead to costs CR for the firm. As 
already mentioned, the fine to be paid by a non-compliant firm amounts to 5.5 US$ 
per car sold per 0.1 mpg of shortfall, which indicates a linear penalty function. In 
  5order, however, to account for additional indirect costs of non-compliance (such as 
bad publicity)
4, a more general quadratic function is allowed for CR: 
CR = α0 (F – F
R)
2         ( 2 )  
with α0 ≥ 0. This formulation allows costs to occur both when F > F
R and F < F
R. In 
other words, it includes both the ‘penalty’ and the ‘norm’ hypothesis for the standard 
as explained in the section 2. Since, however, we want to be able to test these two 
hypotheses separately, we can take α0=α2+α3 so that equation (2) becomes 
CR = (α2+α3) (F – F
R)
2       ( 3 )  
where  
α2 > 0 and α3 = 0  if  F > F
R   (regulation acting as penalty for non-compliance)   
α2 = 0 and α3 > 0  if  F < F
R   (regulation acting as a norm) 
The total costs to the firm will be C = CM + CR. From equations (1) and (3) we get 
C = α1 (F
* – F)
2 + (α2+α3) (F – F
R)
2       (4) 
with α2 and α3 taking the values mentioned above. 
Minimizing this cost function, i.e. setting dC/dF = 0, we get 
2α1 (F – F
*) + 2(α2+α3) (F – F
R) = 0       ( 5 )  
and, solving for F, we derive the simple fuel consumption model 
F = (1 – β2 – β3) F
* + (β2 + β3) F








=  and 
3 2 1
3




= . Following the above definitions of 
α2 and α3 we get 
β2 > 0 and β3 = 0  if  F > F
R        ( 6 a )  
β2 = 0 and β3 > 0  if  F < F
R        ( 6 b )  
 
Thus equation (6) enables examining empirically three different assumptions: 
−  the ‘penalty’ hypothesis by simply testing β2 = 0 ;  
−  the ‘norm’ hypothesis by testing β3 = 0 ; 
−  the significance of standards: if  β2 + β3 = 0  then standards become ineffective 
whereas if  β2 + β3 = 1 standards are the sole determinants of FE levels. 
In order to explore the cumulative role of standards on fuel economy, a specification 
is necessary that enables testing whether it is the actual or the ‘notional’ (i.e. 
unconstrained) past fuel economy values that influence current manufacturer 
decisions. For this purpose, suppose that ‘notional’ fuel consumption levels can be 
modeled with the following dynamic equation: 
                                                 
4 See [13] for a justification of quadratic non-compliance costs. Recently an environmental group 
evaluated the fuel economy performance of auto manufacturers in Europe and published the results, 
praising the top-runners; see http://www.transportenvironment.org/Article250.html. 
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*         ( 7 )  
where  k
* > 0 and Xjt are exogenous variables that determine  . Reorganizing 




* – F = β (F
* – F
R)         ( 8 )  
Substituting (8) into (7) we get 
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*       ( 1 0 )  
with k = k
* β.  
This formulation shows that in each year the unconstrained fuel consumption   
depends on the actual lagged fuel consumption Ft-1 and the extent to which the firm 
was constrained by the standard in the previous year (expressed by the term 
). As both k
* and β are positive, k is also positive and since it is reasonable 
to expect that  , this difference has an increasing effect on current 
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where β3 = 0  if  F > F
R  and  β2 = 0  if  F < F
R. 
 
This means for example that if   increased because of consumer preferences for 
more powerful cars or due to low fuel prices, then the distance of F
* from a given 
standard has grown in the past year, i.e. the manufacturer became more constrained in 
order to attain the standard. This in turn tends to increase current actual fuel 
consumption levels and put additional burden to the firm. If such an effect is 
confirmed empirically (something that can be tested by checking the hypothesis k=0 
in the above equation), it means that a ‘catch-up’ effect (i.e. a fast increase in actual 
fuel consumption) should be expected once the standard is abolished. In case the 
standard continues to be in force but is not tightened (i.e. F
R remains constant over the 
years), an eventual continuous increase of   will further constrain the firm and 
make it more difficult to meet the standard. 
*
1 − t F
*
1 − t F
 
  74. Empirical strategy 


















0 3 3 2 2    (12) 
where εt is an error term with the usual properties and D2, D3 are dummy variables for 
which: 
•  D2 = 0 if F<F
R or if does not exist (i.e. for all years before the implementation 
of standards) and D2 = 1 in all other cases; 
R
t F
•  D3 = 0 if F≥ F




The unconstrained fuel consumption level F
* is given by equation (7): 
t
j
jt j t t X k F k k F ξ + + + = ∑
* *
0
*        ( 1 3 )  
with ξt an i.i.d. error term. 
For periods when standards do not exist, i.e. there is no F
R, Ft is equal to and one 
can estimate k0, k
* and kj from equation (13) and use these estimates to estimate 
equation (12) for the period with standards. 
*
t F
During periods when FE standards are in force,   is unobserved. In order to 
overcome this problem and reach a tractable specification, one can replace the term 
 in equation (12) with a period-specific dummy. From the significance and 
the magnitude of these time effects one can then make inferences on the value of k as 
will be shown in the empirical demonstration below.  
*





t t F F − − −
Thus the empirical strategy involves two steps: a) selection of appropriate exogenous 
regressors  Xj; b) estimation of F from equation (12). These steps will now be 
described. 
Considering the selection of variables Xj, it is reasonable to assume that the ‘optimal’ 
fuel economy level F
*, which would materialize if no regulations were in place, is 
primarily determined by consumer preferences. Consumer choice will in turn depend 
on per capita income, current and lagged fuel prices and the overall technological 
level of the firm which determines how consumer preferences for acceleration, top 
speed, safety, comfort etc. can be met by models that the firm makes available to the 
market.  
Although major vehicle attributes such as engine size, engine maximum power 
output, top vehicle speed, vehicle mass and acceleration are routinely available data 
sets for each auto manufacturer, they may be of little use for describing vehicle 
technology. First, none of these features alone can sufficiently describe the 
technological level: it is difficult to find any clear linkage between advances e.g. in a 
vehicle’s rolling and aerodynamic resistance (which are crucial for fuel economy) and 
                                                 
5 In the following equations I have omitted the firm-specific indicator i to facilitate presentation. 
  8any one of the above attributes. Second, all of them (plus others derived from them 
such as the power-to-mass ratio of vehicles) depend on consumer income and fuel 
prices. To give some examples: a richer population would prefer bigger and more 
powerful cars; high fuel prices would encourage consumers to trade off some 
performance for greater fuel economy and hence lower operating costs; and a greater 
power-to-mass ratio, which may indicate technological advances due to the use of 
lightweight materials in modern cars, may partly be an effect of fuel prices that have 
induced this technical progress. Therefore, including one or more vehicle attributes in 
the list of regressors Xj would lead to endogeneity problems.  
Hence it seems wiser to capture the evolution of firm-specific vehicle technology over 
time through the period-specific dummy that replaces the term  . 
Obviously this dummy will account, apart from technical progress, for the composite 
effect of various other factors such as changing consumer preferences that are not 
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Using a maximum lag order of 3 for fuel prices, which is consistent with stated 
consumer preferences
6 and with the time it may take for manufacturers to adjust their 
product offerings in order to account for changing consumer demand induced by fuel 
prices, equation (13) can thus be written as follows: 
() t t
l










*      (14) 
where  p is real gasoline price per liter and PCGDP is real per capita GDP. 
Substituting the exogenous Xj regressors in equation (12) and substituting also the 
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5. Application with US data 
 
5.1. Data description 
In the United States, CAFE standards were adopted in 1975 when the ‘Energy Policy 
Conservation Act’ was enacted into law by Congress
7. Specific values of standards 
were enforced starting with model year 1978 for cars and model year 1982 for light 
duty trucks. The penalty for failing to meet CAFE standards is currently US$5.50 for 
each tenth of mpg beyond the standard times the total sales volume of vehicles 
manufactured in a given model year. Since 1975, FE data have been collected for 
                                                 
6 For example, [13] cites a study which finds that consumers form their expectations about future 
gasoline prices based on trends over the last sixteen months.  
7 See http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/cafe/overview.htm. 
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individual vehicles such as mass, engine size, type of transmission, number of valves 
per cylinder etc. The US National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 
is responsible for establishing and amending the standards, while the US 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is responsible for calculating the average 
fuel economy for each manufacturer. The EPA maintains a comprehensive database 
and publishes aggregate and detailed information every year. For the analysis 
described here I used the latest publication [19], which contains data for model years 
1975 through 2006. The Agency reports aggregate as well as manufacturer-specific 
data, distinguishing 8 major automobile manufacturer groups that accounted together 
for more than 95% of sales of model year 2006 vehicles (DaimlerChrysler, Ford, 
General Motors, Honda, Hyundai-Kia, Nissan, Toyota and Volkswagen), and a ninth 
category comprising data of all other firms.  
Data are available for the following vehicle categories: passenger cars, station 
wagons, vans, sport utility vehicles and pickups. Passenger cars and wagons constitute 
the ‘car’ group for which CAFE standards were first implemented in 1978, while the 
latter three categories make up the ‘truck’ group with its own standards that started in 
1982. The ‘car’ group is quite homogenous, constrained by the same FE standard each 
year and forming an almost balanced panel of 277 observations (the panel is not 
perfectly balanced because there are no data for Hyundai-Kia vehicles for years 1975–
1985). Conversely, the ‘truck’ group is heterogeneous: it consists of quite different 
vehicle types, with some of the vehicles being used as passenger cars and some for 
goods transport; moreover, it has many gaps in data so that 4 out of the 9 cross-
sections (Honda, Hyundai-Kia, Volkswagen and other vehicles) have to be dropped 
from the sample because of too few observations, thus leaving a sample size of 160. 
Because of heterogeneity and small sample size of trucks, I based the analysis on the 
car sample only. 
The CAFE legislation foresees that each year the standard for cars is applied 
separately for the domestically produced and the imported fleet of each manufacturer. 
Historically, the imported fleet of most manufacturers was more fuel efficient than the 
domestic one until the end of the 1990s, whereas differences in FE performance 
almost diminished afterwards
8. The EPA has stopped using the ‘domestic’ and 
‘imported’ classification in its reports, noting that: “As the automotive industry has 
become more transnational in nature, this type of vehicle classification has become 
less useful”. Therefore, it reports data “by groups of manufacturers … to reflect the 
transnational and transregional nature of the automobile industry” [19, p. 79]. In the 
analysis presented here, the distinction between ‘domestic’ and ‘imported’ fleets 
would be even less useful since the model that I examine attempts to simulate each 
manufacturer’s behavior; switching between different parts of the fleet of the same 
firm is part of this behavior to respond to regulatory constraints, so it would not be 
appropriate to examine ‘domestic’ and ‘imported’ fleets of the same firm separately. 
Another reason for using composite fleet data by manufacturer is that only the 
NHTSA reports separate ‘domestic’ and ‘imported’ FE data but does not report other 
                                                 
8 See US NHTSA’s report ‘Summary of Fuel Economy Performance’ at   
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/cafe/index.htm 
  10vehicle attributes (e.g. engine power) of each fleet; moreover, the EPA provides a 
more consistent grouping of manufacturers during the entire period 1975–2006. For 
these reasons I used the composite (domestic + imported) EPA data. 
The EPA reports two sets of FE information: ‘laboratory’ and ‘adjusted’ data. The 
‘adjusted’ figures are reportedly closer to real-world vehicle fuel economy. For the 
purpose of this analysis, however, ‘laboratory’ readings are more appropriate since 
they are directly comparable with the corresponding CAFE standard, thus enabling 
the application of the model described in the previous section. Therefore, the 
‘laboratory’ data set was employed in this analysis. 
Firm-specific data in equation (15) are those for fleet-average fuel consumption and 
are plotted in Figure 1 for the ‘car’ vehicle group of each one of the nine 
manufacturers mentioned above. It is evident that in the early 1980s, among major 
manufacturers, Ford and General Motors were non-compliant, and could only satisfy 
the regulations by using credits earned by complying in some years to offset shortfalls 
in others. Others had to pay fines for exceeding the standard
9, while since 1990 there 






































































Figure 1: Data by automobile manufacturer group for cars of model years 1975–2006: fuel 
consumption (weighted average for domestic and imported fleet of each company), fuel prices 
and the corresponding CAFE standard. Source: [19]. Real gasoline prices come from [21] and 
[7]. GM, DC, HK and VW stand for General Motors, DaimlerChrysler, Hyundai-Kia and 
Volkswagen respectively. 
 
                                                 
9 Most prominent examples of non-compliant forms were BMW (which is mixed with other firms in 
the ‘Others’ category of Figure 1) and Mercedes-Benz (which is currently part of the DaimlerChrysler 
group).  
  11Per capita GDP was derived from data on population and total GDP (in 2000 US 
dollars) from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis
10. Real gasoline prices were taken 
from the International Energy Agency [21] and the US Department of Energy [7]. 
 
5.2. Final specification and results 
The time effect kYt of equation (15), which has replaced the term , has to 
be firm-specific because the unconstrained FE level   differs for each firm. 
However, using 32 period-specific dummies (for years 1975 through 2006) for each 
cross-section in a sample with 9 cross-sections only causes collinearity problems. 
Therefore, I split the 1975–2006 period in three parts: the pre-standard period (1975–
1977), the period when standards were becoming continuously tighter (1978–1989) 
and the period with stagnant CAFE standard (1990–2006). For the two latter periods I 
constructed dummy variables D7889 and D9006 respectively, which take the value of 
unity during the corresponding period and the value of zero in all other years. For 
light trucks the corresponding periods were 1982–1995 and 1996–2006. Using these 
dummies with cross-section specific coefficients in the model one may approach the 
manufacturers’ decision making process avoiding at the same time collinearity 
problems. Thus, transforming equation (15) as explained above and adding the cross-
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To estimate this model, I produced a system of 9 equations for the car model, one for 
each cross-section. As the equations are not simultaneous but have partly common 
exogenous regressors, I estimated this system using Zellner’s Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (SUR) method [44] which allows for contemporaneously correlated errors 
across the equations.  
Table 1 reports the results. Parameter β2 comes out as significant and takes the value 
of 0.37. The lagged endogenous and some lagged price variables are also significant, 
with the overall price effect being about –0.13
11. Conversely, β3 has a low value 
(0.02) and is not significant. The income effect is also very small and insignificant. In 
line with the model description in section 2, the implications of this result are that: 
•  CAFE standards seem to have played a major role in determining the fuel 
economy of cars in the US since their implementation, but were not an absolutely 
binding constraint: the hypothesis β2+β3=1 is rejected at the 1% significance 
level
12. Market forces and fuel prices have also affected fuel economy. 
                                                 
10 Data are available on the World Wide Web at http://www.bea.gov. 
11 The low value of some coefficients in absolute terms (e.g. k11) should not be directly interpreted as a 
very low impact of prices: variables do not enter as logarithms in the equation, hence these coefficients 
should not be mistaken for elasticities. 
12 In fact some auto firms, mainly Japanese manufacturers, could relatively easily fulfil the CAFE 
requirements throughout the 1978–2006 period, as is evident from Figure 1. 
  12Regulations have been effective because of the penalties they imposed to non-
compliant firms. 
•  If the model is a good approximation of reality, it seems that standards have not 
acted as norms for complying firms: auto manufacturers that consistently 
produced more fuel efficient cars than what was required by CAFE did not 
significantly shift their sales towards less efficient cars. The hypothesis of 
deterioration of fuel economy as a negative side effect of CAFE implementation is 
not confirmed. 
•  After controlling for fuel prices and regulations, per capita income did not 
significantly affect new-car fuel economy. Although this may be a surprising 
finding, it is not very different from earlier evidence. Dahl [5], based on US data, 
estimated a mostly negative impact of income on fuel consumption. This result 
was confirmed by [22] for their panel of 12 OECD countries. [8], with data from 8 
OECD countries, found income to be insignificant for fuel consumption, while 
[10] did not even include income among the explanatory variables. On the other 
hand, [40] found a small but significant and positive income elasticity in his panel 
of 90 countries, which included data from several low-income world regions
13. 
The diversity of these findings implies that it is not simple to interpret the income 
effect: on the one hand, cars that consume more fuel may be associated with high 
income consumers buying bigger and more luxurious cars; on the other hand older 
and technologically least advanced cars, driven by low-income people, may be the 
greatest gas guzzlers. While the first observation points to a positive effect of 
income on fuel consumption, the latter one indicates a negative income effect. As 
these contrasting impacts may cancel each other out, it should not be surprising 
that the aggregate income effect is not significant in this context. 
Firm-specific time effects are significant in the model but do not display a common 
trend: some of them are increasing and some decreasing over time. Recall that in the 
empirical formulation of section 3 this effect was used in order to represent the term 
of the theoretical specification. The significance of this effect seems to 
confirm that in each year actual fuel consumption depends on the actual lagged fuel 
consumption Ft-1 and the extent to which the firm was constrained by the standard in 
the previous year – see equation (11). As income and fuel prices have been explicitly 
included in equation (16), the time effect expresses the composite impact of changing 
consumer attitude towards valuing fuel economy, and changes in the firms’ 
technological level. The relevant evidence, however, shows that consumers do not 
value fuel economy highly in their purchase decisions [3], and this has remained 
essentially unchanged over the years [28]. Therefore, the hypothesis of increasing or 
decreasing consumer awareness cannot be supported, hence the changing time effects 






t t F F k − − −
An increasing effect over time shows that a firm may have been more constrained by 
regulations in the most recent period (1990–2006), despite the fact that standards were 
not tightened after 1990. A reason for this may be consumer demand for bigger and 
                                                 
13 All these findings refer to fleet-average and not new-car fuel consumption. 
  13more powerful cars, which has outweighed technological advances that have 
improved vehicle fuel economy. Conversely, a decreasing effect over time seems to 
indicate that a firm has gradually adjusted its production and technological level in 
such a way that it can fulfil both consumer preferences and regulatory requirements. 
Exploiting the stagnation of CAFE standards since 1990 and technical progress in 
modern cars, these firms were able to accommodate for increasing comfort and safety 
preferences without sacrificing fuel economy. In the first case, the ‘notional’ market-
based FE level F
* approaches the level mandated by the CAFE standard F
R; in the 
second case F
* moves further away from F
R.  
On a closer inspection, however, time effects are almost invariant over time and 
similar across firms. In fact, Wald tests in every individual firm show that δ1 is not 
significantly different from δ2 in any firm. Most importantly, the joint hypothesis that 
all time coefficients are equal (i.e. δ1,DC = δ2,DC = δ1,GM = δ2,GM =…) cannot be rejected 
(p-value is 0.40). This finding indicates that throughout the whole period ‘with 
standards), i.e. post-1978, the burden that manufacturers faced in complying with 
regulations was essentially the same every year. 
 
  14Table 1: Regression results. 
Coefficient (std.  error)
β 2 0.373 ** (0.146)
β 3 0.023 (0.026)
k 0 0.194 (1.466)
k* 0.830 *** (0.027)
k 10 0.004 (0.006)
k 11 -0.034 *** (0.010)
k 12 0.021 ** (0.009)
k 13 0.005 (0.007)
k 2 0.010 (0.008)
Time effects: Observations Adjusted R
2
DaimlerChrysler δ 1 1.038 * (0.533) 32 0.919
δ 2 1.249 ** (0.507)
Ford δ 1 1.195 ** (0.531) 32 0.928
δ 2 1.223 ** (0.502)
General Motors δ 1 1.274 ** (0.524) 32 0.960
δ 2 1.175 ** (0.497)
Honda δ 1 1.118 ** (0.513) 32 0.081
δ 2 1.036 ** (0.495)
Hyundai-Kia δ 1 1.006 ** (0.500) 21 0.418
δ 2 1.117 ** (0.491)
Nissan δ 1 1.110 ** (0.518) 32 0.120
δ 2 1.165 ** (0.496)
Toyota δ 1 1.088 ** (0.523) 32 0.405
δ 2 1.082 ** (0.501)
Volkswagen δ 1 1.160 ** (0.515) 32 0.289
δ 2 1.202 ** (0.497)
Other δ 1 1.210 ** (0.514) 32 0.781
δ 2 1.250 ** (0.492)
Total observations: 277
 
Notes: See equation (16) for explanation of coefficients. *, ** and *** denote significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
 
Since time effects turned out to be equal across firms, it is necessary to explore this 
issue in more detail. Therefore, I further divided the 1975–2006 period and estimated 
a model without firm-specific time effects – see equation (17) below
14. I split the 
                                                 
14 A model like equation (17) but with cross-section-specific time dummies could not be estimated 
because of collinearity problems. 
  151975–2006 period in five instead of three sub-periods: without CAFE standard (1975–
1977), with rising standard and high oil prices (1978–1985), with partly rising 
standard and low oil prices (1986–1989), with stagnant standard and low oil prices 
(1990–1999) and with stagnant standard and higher oil prices (2000–2006). The 
rationale behind that split was to examine whether the burden on the industry overall 
increased or decreased during the 1990s when standards were not tightened at all and 
oil prices were low. 
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Table 2 reports the results. Except for the pre-standard period 1975–1977, time effects 
are significant and have been falling under these specifications. This implies that, for 
the automobile industry as a whole, technical progress over the years has been 
important in continuously reducing the burden that standards have put on companies. 
Even in times of low oil prices (1986–1989 and 1990–1999) and despite consumer 
purchases of ever more powerful cars (see Figure 2), the degree of constraint on 
manufacturers seems to have decreased somewhat. Recall that low fuel prices and 
preference for more powerful cars tend to increase the ‘notional’ market-based fuel 
consumption F
* and thus to bring it further away from the regulatory standard F
R. 
Therefore, results show that during the 1990s technological advances helped the 
automotive industry to avoid being put in greater pressure from the co-existence of 
CAFE standards and higher values of F
*.
15 This is in line with what Sperling et al. 
[38, p. 12] note: “Technological innovation dampens the cost of complying with new 
regulations”. 
After 2000, however, the time effect was essentially the same as in 1990–1999: 
despite somewhat rising fuel prices, the burden on the industry was not reduced 
further. This may indicate that there are limits to what technology can achieve, when 
vehicles become ever bigger and more powerful
16. 
Conclusions for the estimates of other parameters from equation (17) remain 
essentially the same as those based on equation (16). 
 
                                                 
15 Obviously, if standards had been tightened during the 1990s, i.e. F
R had become lower, it would be 
reasonable to expect that the burden on the industry would have increased, perhaps pushing it towards 
more advanced technological solutions or changes in the vehicle sales mix in order to comply with 
CAFE requirements. 
16 A close examination of the temporal evolution of two efficiency indicators, the power-to-mass ratio 
and the ton-mpg metric for each manufacturer (see [19]), shows a fairly steady annual efficiency 
improvement from the early 1980s to 2006 and does not reveal any substantial changes after 2000. 
However, as mentioned in section 4, none of these two indicators can sufficiently capture all 
technological advances in automobiles, therefore they are not reported here for the sake of brevity. 
  16Table 2: Regression results for the model without firm-specific time effects. 
Coefficient (std.  error)
β 2 0.569 *** (0.147)
β 3 0.007 (0.034)
k* 0.827 *** (0.030)
k 10 -0.001 (0.006)
k 11 -0.034 *** (0.010)
k 12 0.020 ** (0.009)
k 13 0.000 (0.007)
k 2 0.011 (0.014)
δ 1 1.809 (1.971)
δ 2 1.658 ** (0.807)
δ 3 1.490 * (0.759)
δ 4 1.450 * (0.747)














Notes: See equation (17) for explanation of coefficients. *, ** and *** denote significance at 
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Figure 2: Average sales-weighted engine power output of vehicles in the US market, 1975–
2006. See Figure 1 for explanation of data source and abbreviations. 
 
5.3. Implications for public policy 
The results reported above are in line with those of other studies. The finding that 
CAFE standards have been significant (but not the only) determinants of new-car fuel 
economy since the late 1970s confirms results of Greene [13], Small and van Dender 
[37] and Clerides and Zachariadis [4], each one of whom employed a different type of 
model. Conversely, Gately [10] did not identify a significant effect of standards but, 
as [4] explain, this may have been a result of the sample that was available to him 
during that period. 
Furthermore, the low and insignificant value of β3 shows that a shift towards less 
efficient cars may not have taken place among manufacturers who complied with 
CAFE rules, thereby rejecting the hypothesis that there was such a negative side effect 
of CAFE. This finding somewhat contradicts those of Greene [13] and Thorpe [41]. 
However, Greene’s sample, which is similar to the one I used here, included data 
from model years 1978–1989, whereas the sample in this paper covers the 1975–2006 
period. As regards Thorpe’s result, as mentioned in the section 2, it is sensitive to the 
elasticities of substitution he assumes. On the other hand, the model proposed here 
does not account for the possibility of a manufacturer to shift sales from cars to light 
duty trucks. Therefore, the insignificance of β3 cannot completely rule out that a 
‘norm’ effect has taken place. Many analysts have suggested revising the current 
CAFE system in order to avoid such undesirable impacts. [33] and [36] provide some 
solutions that, though not perfect, might help overcome those problems, such as: 
allowing for differentiation of standards based on vehicle attributes, enabling the use 
  18of tradable FE permits among manufacturers, demanding uniform percentage 
increases in fuel economy for all companies, or tightening standards of light trucks . 
The two slightly different models that have been tested here – equations (16) and (17) 
– indicate that CAFE standards may have gradually become less restrictive for the 
auto industry, despite consumers’ desire for more powerful and comfortable cars. As 
the models account explicitly for income, price and regulatory effects, this result must 
be attributed to technological advances in vehicle engines and accessories and to the 
fact that standards have not been tightened since 1990. It might be possible to 
conclude that, to some extent, the CAFE program has induced considerable 
improvements in automobile technology by forcing manufacturers to satisfy market 
expectations and efficiency regulations at the same time
17. Obviously, this does not 
necessarily imply that CAFE has been the most cost-effective way to attain these 
improvements, but only that, ceteris paribus, these would not have appeared to that 
extent in the absence of regulations and in a world of low oil prices. 
Another policy implication of declining time effects in equation (17) is that, although 
the results confirm that fuel economy depends on its ‘notional’ market-optimal value, 
a ‘catch-up’ effect becomes less likely than it was in the 1980s and the early 1990s. In 
other words, if CAFE standards were lifted today, new cars sold in the market would 
become less efficient than under the CAFE regime, but this effect would not be very 
pronounced. This has to be attributed to technical progress again, which is largely 
irreversible: as soon as more efficient engines and vehicle accessories (e.g. tyres, 
lightweight materials etc.) are embedded in the production process, they will most 
probably remain even under very low energy prices and in the absence of efficiency 
standards that caused their development in the first place [15, 42]. CAFE standards 
have become somewhat easier to meet in the last years, largely because they have not 
been tightened since 1990, so that even their abolition might not cause much 
deterioration in new car fuel efficiency – although it would not cause an efficiency 
improvement either.  
Evidently, there are caveats in this study too. First, the analysis uses annual average 
data at firm level; micro data from individual companies, not available to the author, 
would constitute a richer and more diverse sample that might produce more insight 
into the issues discussed here. Second, the specification employed does not account 
for the provision of CAFE to allow companies that over-comply in one year to 
transfer credits to the next or previous 3 years. At least two US manufacturers (Ford 
and GM) made some use of these credits in 1983–1985. However, credit transfer was 
not used extensively by other major manufacturers and during the post-1985 period, 
so that omitting this effect should not alter the overall policy conclusions. Finally, the 
model covers a homogenous vehicle group only (cars and wagons) and hence cannot 
account for eventual shifts from cars to light trucks in company sales. After 1990, 
light truck sales increased continuously, reaching half of all new vehicle sales in year 
                                                 
17 As Sperling et al. [38, pp. 12-13] note, “New regulations that improve vehicle safety and 
environmental and energy performance also impose additional costs. But these additional costs are not 
permanent nor cumulative. As with any new products or technologies, with time and experience 
engineers learn to design the products to use less space, operate more efficiently, use less material, and 
facilitate manufacturing. They also learn to build factories in ways that reduce manufacturing cost”. 
  192003 [19]. However, this important effect can be clearly attributed to the less stringent 
CAFE standards for light trucks and not to an eventual role of standards acting as 
norms. Therefore, applying a more complex model that would consider firm behavior 
as regards fuel economy of cars and light trucks at the same time would probably not 
add much to the regulatory assessment discussed here. 
A final word must be said about Europe. Currently there is an intense discussion 
about setting standards to restrain energy use and CO2 emissions in Europe as well. 
However, an agreement of the automotive industry with the European Commission 
(the European Union’s executive body) to reduce car CO2 emissions does not require 
that fuel consumption figures are reported for each manufacturer separately [6]. As a 
result, the European, Japanese and Korean automobile manufacturer associations 
publish annual fuel consumption and CO2 emission data of their EU car sales as 
averages over all their individual member companies. This is a feature of the 
agreement that has been criticized by many analysts for lack of transparency [23, 43]. 
Because of this, the model presented in this paper cannot be applied to European data. 
An important aspect of the agreement in Europe is that it is voluntary, so that it would 
be particularly interesting to examine what role it has played in the evolution of car 
FE and explore potential differences from the effect of mandatory CAFE standards in 
the US. In the absence of appropriate data, however, this analysis cannot be 
performed. 
 
6. Conclusion and outlook 
The role of regulatory standards and the response of citizens and firms affected by 
them have been explored theoretically and empirically in various degrees. Usually, 
theoretical analyses involved sophisticated model formulations originating from 
microeconomic or game theory, which could not be tested on empirical grounds. The 
model I proposed in this paper has a theoretical background but is quite simple and 
formulated in such a way that enables drawing empirical conclusions on the basis of 
usual hypothesis tests. The model specification allows to explore three potential roles 
of standards: they can act as penalties for non-compliant firms, as norms to which all 
firms (both complying and non-complying) converge, and as controls with cumulative 
impact on firm behavior over time. 
I tested this specification focusing on the issue of motor vehicle fuel economy 
(CAFE) standards that have been imposed in the US since 1978. I used data on fuel 
consumption and average vehicle attributes from 9 automobile manufacturer groups 
for the period 1975–2006. The results are in line with most findings of previous 
studies: CAFE rules, acting mainly as penalties for non-compliant companies, have 
been a very important (though not the sole) determinant of car fuel consumption in the 
US since their implementation; consumer preferences, fuel prices and technology 
have also affected the overall picture. The assumption that standards acted also as 
norms was not confirmed. Finally, testing for the cumulative impact of CAFE 
revealed that each firm has remained almost equally constrained over the years; for 
the industry as a whole it seems that the unconstrained market-optimal FE level 
gradually approached the level imposed by the standards. This shows that, due to 
  20stagnating CAFE standards since 1990 and technological progress, lifting CAFE 
regulations today might worsen vehicle fuel economy but this effect would not be 
very pronounced unless consumer preferences cause a dramatic increase in average 
car size and power. 
Finally, it is worth noting that an application of the same model to other regulatory 
fields is quite straightforward, provided that the control variable is continuous and the 
regulation addresses directly that variable. In fact, as already mentioned, a similar 
formulation was used in [31] to explore the role of government controls on UK firm 
dividends. To employ the model, one needs to identify the control variable (e.g. 
percentage increase in distributed dividends, energy efficiency, emissions of a 
pollutant, concentration of a toxic element in wastewater, content of a specific 
substance in a food or drink etc.), the corresponding standard and some exogenous 
variables that affect the unconstrained value of the control variable (F
* in the notation 
of equation (16)). However, in order to accommodate more complex or less 
straightforward regulations such as the minimum standards on health insurance 
coverage analyzed in [9] or the safety standards examined in [30], different 
formulations would be necessary. 
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